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Abstract—Interconnected everyday objects, either via public or
private networks, are gradually becoming reality in modern
life – often referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT) or
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). One stand-out example are
those systems based on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
Fleets of such vehicles (drones) are prophesied to assume
multiple roles from mundane to high-sensitive applications,
such as prompt pizza or shopping deliveries to the home, or to
deployment on battlefields for battlefield and combat missions.
Drones, which we refer to as UAVs in this paper, can operate
either individually (solo missions) or as part of a fleet (group
missions), with and without constant connection with a base
station. The base station acts as the command centre to manage
the drones’ activities; however, an independent, localised and
effective fleet control is necessary, potentially based on swarm
intelligence, for several reasons: 1) an increase in the number
of drone fleets; 2) fleet size might reach tens of UAVs; 3)
making time-critical decisions by such fleets in the wild; 4)
potential communication congestion and latency; and 5) in
some cases, working in challenging terrains that hinders or
mandates limited communication with a control centre, e.g.
operations spanning long period of times or military usage
of fleets in enemy territory. This self-aware, mission-focused
and independent fleet of drones may utilise swarm intelligence
for a), air-traffic or flight control management, b) obstacle
avoidance, c) self-preservation (while maintaining the mission
criteria), d) autonomous collaboration with other fleets in the
wild, and e) assuring the security, privacy and safety of physical
(drones itself) and virtual (data, software) assets. In this paper,
we investigate the challenges faced by fleet of drones and
propose a potential course of action on how to overcome them.
1. Introduction
Drone technology is developing at a breath-taking pace.
From toys for hobbyists, it has now reached a state where
both the private and public sectors can rely on them as
tools to provide value-added services to users [1]. The low
cost and mobilisation time of drones are two major drivers
behind their adoption. Checking the structural integrity of
a building, for example, is much cheaper with drones than
with other aerial platforms, such as helicopters, or with high-
rise cranes. Similarly, drones may be deployed faster than
police helicopters – a potentially attractive feature required
by law-enforcement agencies.
Most likely, however, drones would not operate indi-
vidually or in isolation; individual drones may form part
of a fleet managed by the same organisation, where mission
objectives are achievable only if fleet participants cooperate.
Moreover, airspaces may contain drones from other organi-
sations, where individual drones and fleets must negotiate to
operate safely. Another complexity is that the airspace might
be governed by a local government authority, which may use
an automated management system to handle a dynamic and
congested airspace containing large numbers of UAVs.
1.1. Context
There are multiple ways in which UAV fleets can be
managed; for example, all decisions might be taken by
the fleet management authority (also referred to as control
centre). This requires drones to communicate information
to the ground fleet management system, potentially in real-
time, and to quickly react to any received instructions.
For certain situations, as discussed previously, drone fleets
are likely to act autonomously and should make in-flight
decisions without requiring explicit permission from a fleet
management control system on the ground.
Individual drones, with limited computation power, may
not be suited for autonomous behaviour if it is based on
Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques – limited computa-
tional and storage resources along with real-time decision
requirements imposes just challenges. To overcome this
limitation, drone fleets may be behave like swarms, where
AI algorithms designed for the Swarm Intelligence paradigm
can be applied. For Fleets of Drones (FoD) that use swarm
intelligence, we refer to them as ‘Swarm of Drones (SoD)’;
the rest are referred to as ‘FoD’. An important consideration
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in swarm intelligence is the nature of the swarm and rela-
tionship between swarm-objects, particularly the concept of
individual objects entering and leaving the swarm. This is
crucial for a SoD that might either be static, dynamic or
hybrid fleets. In a static fleet, all drones remain together
for the whole duration of the mission. In dynamic fleets,
individual drones may enter and leave the fleet as necessary
or required by their mission. Lastly, hybrid fleets have a
partial fleet behaving statically with the rest as a dynamic
fleet.
1.2. Challenges and Problem Statement
For a SoD, there are core operations that are necessary
for successful mission completion. These include flight con-
trol, flight routing, obstacle avoidance, regulation confor-
mation (regarding the airspace usage), and self-protection
(including safety-critical operations) with respect to phys-
ical integrity and cybersecurity. All of these operations
are highly time-sensitive. Collectively, we refer to these
time-sensitive operations as ‘Mission-Critical Operations’
(MCO). The listed operations are loosely related to three
main challenges discussed below.
1.2.1. Swarm Intelligence. Swarm intelligence takes in-
spiration from the collective behaviour of natural systems,
such as swarms of insects; these systems are inherently
decentralised and often have the ability to self-organise.
The ability of a swarm of insects to perform certain tasks
emerges out of the interaction of simple and quasi-identical
agents, which act asynchronously due to the lack of a central
control [2]. Algorithms based on swarm intelligence princi-
ples, like ant colony optimisation, bee-inspired algorithms
and particle-swarm optimisation, are used in optimisation
problems that are static or change over time.
In distributed robotics systems, a swarm or fleet of
autonomous agents may operate in remote locations with
little or no control by a human operator. Swarm robotics
uses large numbers of autonomous and situated robots with
local sensing and communication capabilities [3].
A swarm of robots offers certain advantages over the
use of a single one. Due to the large number of robots, the
workload can be distributed across the swarm, and multiple
tasks can be worked on simultaneously [4]. It further offers
distributed sensing capabilities and an increased robustness
to failure, by eliminating the single point of failure, as
demonstrated in the Swarmanoid project [5].
The swarm’s behaviour is often optimised using evo-
lutionary algorithms; for instance, researchers have suc-
cessfully evolved a swarm’s ability to adapt to unknown
environments [6, 7], its resilience to failure [8], and the
planning and following of formation patterns [5, 9].
1.2.2. Security, Safety and Privacy. Any flying asset –
drones in this case – can be a potential target to harm
its current state or to access the data it contains, whether
it is part of a group or individual. These two elements
raises the challenges of how to implement the security of
the asset so its current state cannot be compromised [10,
11], and how the data can be protected in a manner so
it does not violate any privacy requirements [12]. Similar
issues regarding intentional hacking and signal jamming,
accountability of security issues, management/enforcement
of airspace restrictions, and concerns over privacy and intru-
siveness were detailed in a report to the US Congress [13].
Furthermore, not just national governments are concerned
with the security, safety and privacy of drones flying in
cities – the US Congress passed legislation covering UAVs
development and integration in civilian airspace (PUBLIC
LAW 11295FEB. 14, 2012) – but also general public [14]–
[16]. This is alongside a number of companies trialling the
deployment of drones as part of their on-demand services,
e.g. Amazon for Prime Delivery [17].
Individual drones and FoD, therefore, require strong
assurances in terms of security, safety and privacy. There
are multiple options in which the assurances and counter-
measures can be built for FoD. One option is to opt for a
set of static policies defined before the FoD commences its
mission. This is useful if the FoD operates in an static envi-
ronment that has fixed and predictable behaviour; creating
fixed policies for MCOs is an obvious choice here. In reality,
however, drones operating in the wild1 has the potential
to present scenarios that were not considered previously
by drone owners and operators. For this reason, in this
paper, we forward the proposal of designing SoDs based
on swarm intelligence. All of the MCOs would have a deep
foundation in swarm intelligence and have the potential to
collaboratively learn, evolve and decide the best course of
action when operating in the wild, without depending on a
ground fleet management systems.
1.2.3. Performance and Energy Consumption. Drones are
resource-constrained pieces of equipment; individual aircraft
are heavily impaired by limited processing capabilities and
severe battery or fuel constraints. It is widely acknowledged
that drone power consumption, whether it uses a thermal
or electrical engine, is a major issue [18]. These energy
constraints influences all the parameters of the drone system,
as well as the mission itself. The impact of MCOs on
energy management is important: on one hand, the MCOs
impact the energy consumption – for instance, because of
encryption algorithms [19] – but the power management
must also take MCOs into account, e.g. reserving enough
energy to ensure prompt responses to critical external stimuli
that require quick (and energy demanding) route changes.
Using a swarm is beneficial to ensure that the overall energy
burden is shared, e.g. sharing processing loads (see below),
to maintain continuous flight and mission succession.
Regarding performance in terms of computing power,
even though the technology is evolving very quickly, the
processors embedded on small drones (which usually con-
stitute swarms) are not the most efficient. It should be noted
that this lack of computational power also comes from the
1. Wild: Environment that is not under the control of the drone opera-
tors/owners.
power management issue (see above): the more efficient a
processor, the more power it requires. Therefore, to achieve
a significant level of performance, load sharing (in addition
to highly tuned algorithms) is required. Load can be shared
between the drones of the swarm themselves or between the
drones and some external system (a bigger drone or even a
ground system). For instance in terms of image processing,
mosaicking is often used [20]. It consists of taking several
photos of a given area and then assembling them to build a
global picture that can thereafter be processed depending on
the situation at hand. Such a process can be shared among
the individual drones of the swarm, dispatching the load all
over them [21, 22].
The two challenges described in this section crucially
depend on swarm intelligence, which, in turn, impacts power
consumption and computational capabilities. All challenges
should thus be considered in a holistic approach.
1.3. Contributions
The paper contributes in three main aspects to further
the discussion on the management of autonomous and in-
dependent FoDs that are:
1) A rationale supporting application of drone fleets and
potential impact of building a SoD.
2) A conceptual architecture for the SoD, its different
variants based on the swarm (enrolment) structures and
collaboration models.
3) Finally, charting the open issues that impact SoD in
general but specifically the security, safety and privacy
of SoD.
2. Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related literature from
three aspects.
2.1. Swarm Robotics - Experiencing, Learning and
Adaptation
Swarm intelligence is not a new concept for FoD. Exist-
ing literature [23]–[26] has already explored different uses
of swarm intelligence in the context of FoD, especially in the
case of internal swarm communication and route planning.
However, in related literature, it is difficult to find a case
where swarm intelligence is proposed for all operations
ranging from flight control to cybersecurity – as is the case
of this paper.
The swarm intelligence paradigm has been used to
optimise and control single UAVs: In [27], single vehicle
autonomous path planning by learning from small number
of examples.
In [28], three-dimensional path planning for a single
drone using a bat inspired algorithm to determine suitable
points in space and applying B-spline curves to improve
smoothness of the path.
In [29], authors introduced and validated a decentralised
architecture for search and rescue missions in ground based
robot groups of different sizes. Considered limited com-
munication ability with a command centre and employs
distributed communication.
In [30], distributed unsupervised learning in a swarm
of robots using a particle-swarm optimisation algorithm.
Accounting for limited communication capabilities amongst
members of the swarm. Requires a priori knowledge of the
terrain.
In [9], the authors achieved area coverage for surveil-
lance in a FoD using visual relative localisation for keeping
formation autonomously.
In [31], authors explored the use of swarm intelli-
gence paradigm to control formation flight and stabilisation
through the use of GPS and locally shared information.
In [25], authors have investigated the use of a commu-
nication middleware and a rule based system to command
and control an otherwise autonomous FoD.
2.2. Security, Safety and Privacy of Fleet of Drones
Since the emergence of drones, different papers have
proposed solutions to secure them and their communica-
tions: either a), an alone drone communicating with a GCS
(Ground Control Station) or with other devices, or b), com-
munication inside a FoD. As stated in [32], the attack vectors
to consider are either the capture of drone to make physical
or logical attacks, or attacks through its communication
capabilities – all of which might be conducted by a highly
sophisticated adversary.
2.2.1. Individual Drones. For individual drones controlled
by a GCS, the authors of [33] proposed a protocol to
secure communication along with ensuring that illegitimate
accesses to sensing data is not easily available to an attacker.
While this proposal provides the deniability property to help
to deal with privacy issues (i.e. a GCS is not able to prove to
other parties from which drone the message was received),
it is expensive to implement in terms of computation and
thus energy consumption.
In a similar context, a more efficient proposal relying
only on lightweight primitives was done by the authors
of [34] to establish a secure channel protocol when GCS is
in the communication range of drone. Their proposal ensures
confidentiality and privacy-protection of collected data; if a
drone is captured, data cannot be accessible by an adversary.
In [35], the authors proposed a secure communication
protocol between drones and smart objects based on efficient
Certificateless Signcryption Tag Key Encapsulation Mecha-
nism using ECC, which addresses issue of drone capture.
In [36], the authors used drones to perform efficient in-
ventory and search operations over some RFID tagged assets
using lightweight secure and privacy-preserving serverless
protocols defined in [37], while guaranteeing the privacy
of the tags and the secret when the drone is captured (i.e.
compromised).
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Figure 1. Single drone versus a one-level drones fleet
In [38], the authors proposed a secure and trusted chan-
nel protocol to enable communication of a drone and sensors
of Aircraft Wireless Networks (AWNs) to retrieve collected
data and ensuring their confidentiality.
2.2.2. Drones in Fleet. In the HAMSTER (HeAlthy, Mobil-
ity and Security based data communication archiTEctuRe)
solution for unmanned vehicles [39], the authors presented a
security framework and cryptographic schemes without dis-
cussing specifically of secure channel protocols and issues
of captured drones.
In [40], the authors proposed a secure reactive routing
protocol, called SUAP, for a fleet of drones. The proposal
is efficient to detect and prevent routing, e.g. wormhole and
blackhole attacks, but it does not consider an adversary with
a high attack potential nor the issue of captured drones.
In [32], the authors proposed to address an adversary
with a high attack potential by adding a secure element to
each drone of the fleets. Based on the built architecture,
in [41], they proposed a secure and trusted channel protocol
to establish a secure channel between the communicating
drones and to provide security assurance that each drone is
in the secure and trusted state.
2.3. Performance and Energy Consumption
Energy management is addressed at two different levels:
in terms of refuelling (fuel or batteries) capabilities and in
terms of in-flight/mission power consumption optimization.
Regarding refuelling, research and experiments are being
done to provide mechanisms to reload/refuel during the
flight. Standard avionic procedures are being used/adapted
but more original approaches are also explored, like the
usage of solar panels, laser power beaming or ad hoc hosts
[42] for instance. Regarding in-flight power consumption
optimization, the drone (internal) supervision algorithms
(the algorithms that control the sensors, the IMU, the au-
topilot, etc.) are studied, as well as the algorithms used to
achieve/implement the missions. For instance, flight path
management, sense & avoid, etc. can highly impact power
consumption.
Computational load sharing is addressed mainly by the
computing community, rather than the electronics commu-
nity. Still, it should be noted that strong relationships are
required with the situation management people so as to
determine the important information that are really required
for the decision process [43]. This is to avoid the burden and
thus the processing load of processing potentially useless
data.
It should also be noted that managing and organizing
a swarm induces an overhead in terms of computational
power and energy consumption. Indeed, this requires ad-
ditional communication and management of swarm-related
data (location of drone, proximity, RSSI, etc.). Even though
power consumption has been addressed in some work (see
for instance [44]) it is still an issue to consider. Moreover,
security and safety related features also impact power con-
sumption and computational load, and it is necessary to take
these into account.
3. Fleet of Drones - Why?
Why should FoD can be preferred to single, powerful
drones? As illustrated Fig 1, one of the first interest of
the fleet is to be composed of several smaller drones that
can be equipped with different sensors or other equipments
providing redundancy that can help to tolerate a certain
degree of failure. In addition, a multitude of drones can
cover a larger geographic area than a single one. This can
be performed in a smarter way, since only required drones
with useful capabilities to support the mission can be sent
to specific areas while other drones perform other tasks.
Nevertheless, a single drone would have to attend each
location. FoD can also take advantage of the network they
form altogether to continue to communicate with the GCS
when there are obstacles on the path between some drones
and GCS by simply relying messages to neighbour drones
which are able to establish communication with GCS. Small
drones are also interesting because they are more stealthy,
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Figure 2. A multi-level drones fleets
less noisy than a big drone that might be of interest for both
military and civilian applications. Last, but not least, small
drones can be less expensive than large drone due to their
mass-production, and they might be safer for use in civilian
applications since their weight is smaller, which is safer in
the event of a crash.
However, large drones and smaller versions should not
be opposed since they can be used in a complementary way;
for example, in a multi-level fleet in which they can serve as
relay (they can also be seen as cluster heads) for the smaller
drones to enable communication with a GCS or with other
FoDs. In Figure 2, only a 1-level fleet is depicted.
It is worth noting that FoDs presented before always
received command from the GCS. Of course, they can have a
certain degree of autonomy but standalone swarm of drones,
illustrated in Figure 3 acting like swarm of animals/insects
can be regarded as highly desirable for researchers and
operators. Indeed, once the mission is given, a SoD no
longer requires to be driven by a GCS, hence making it
autonomous and more stealthy.
3.1. Fleet of Drones - Commercial, Civilian and
Military Need
Depending on the end-users, different architectures of
FoDs can be envisioned.
In a commercial context, FoDs can be shared by several
stakeholders to decrease the cost of each having its own
fleets. For instance, it can be imagined FoDs spread over
countries to achieve the entitled missions on-demand of
stakeholders that would have to pay according their uses.
The missions can be of different types, delivery (assets buy
in on-line shops, pizza, drugs, etc.), monitoring of fields or
herds for agriculture sector, surveillance of buildings. The
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main requirement is a good cost effectiveness for FoDs,
i.e. the fleets can be able to be shared between several
stakeholders in a fair usage and in a dynamic way to enable
drones of a fleet to join drones of other fleets to achieve
objective of the missions. For such an applicative context,
a certain degree of autonomy can be useful but essentially
a WAN infrastructure of communication will be used. e.g.
LTE network, to control the FoDs.
In a civilian context, authorities would require safe
and reliable FoDs for rescue operations (fire detection in
forest, searching missing people in sliding snow or after
an earthquake, etc.), for smart city scenarios (detection of
traffic offences, hunt of criminals, etc.), to monitor major in-
frastructures (nuclear plants, pipelines of oil and gas, power
lines, water reserves, airports, railways, etc.) and borders. In
this context, most applications can use WAN communication
infrastructure to control the FoD, in addition to the drone-
to-drone communication inside the FoD, to exchange data
and potentially control commands to achieve the mission.
One of the scenarios where communication infrastructures
might no longer exist is after a disaster (earthquake, tsunami,
hurricane, huge terrorist attacks) that destroyed them. Au-
thorities can also use FoDs to fight against malevolent drone
flying in forbidden areas by capturing it.
In a military context, requirements are stealth, protection
of data regarding the missions (flight plans) and the data
collected (positions of interests), adaptability to the adverse
condition when deployed in the field. For stealth, SoDs are
the best since they do not use the wide range communication
which minimises potential detection by the adversaries. The
SoD is adaptive to adverse conditions, to failure or destruc-
tion of some drones, to fulfil the missions. In any case, FoD
or SoD of drones are more resilient than single drone for
most of applications in this context.
It is worth noting that the security and privacy protection
are requirements shared by all contexts.
3.2. Use Cases
This section present three use cases for FoDs and SoDs.
3.2.1. Rescue Operation in Remote Areas. FoDs and
SoDs can be used in several rescue operations in remote
areas where an event – earthquakes, for instance – has made
access difficult or dangerous for emergency services. They
can also be used to set up a network of communication
dedicated to emergency staff for data exchange or to recover
public networks (like 3G/4G) to enable victims and other
people to communicate with their families or urgency staff.
FoD can also be used in case of sliding snow to cover a wide
area than human persons to search victims. In addition, such
small drones can fly closer to the ground than big drone.
This can more efficient to detect signs of life; for instance,
to look for people at sea after a plane crash. FoDs can cover
a larger area than conventional means (helicopters, planes
and ships). For such scenario, autonomy in energy is an
issue to deal with.
3.2.2. Facility Surveillance and Fault Detection. As men-
tioned previously, FoDs can be used for surveillance of
wide area to detect abnormal event. For instance, they can
detect fire in natural parks or forests by covering wide area
equipped with multiple sensors (e.g. thermal) and they can
also fight it with embedded dedicated payload to extinguish
the flames before they grow. For buildings and any large
infrastructure requiring a high security, FoDs can provide an
additional security level by providing a third dimension in
defence against intrusion or degradation. Indeed the drones
help to detect intruders based on embedded sensors and
camera. However they can also provide a fourth dimension
by being able to fight promptly against intruders, potentially
at the price of their own destruction. For instance, recently
at the time of the writing, a few hundred dollars drone land
on the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth – without anyone
raising the alarm. It can be imagined that one or several
drones of a FoD protecting this ship would have tried to
capture and/or to destroy the intruder’s drone by sacrificing
them if required. For border surveillance, FoDs can help
cost efficiency by avoiding continuous human patrols or wall
construction.
3.2.3. Data Collection. FoDs can also help to collect data
from wireless sensors nodes (WSN) which are not always
connected to a sink having a permanent internet connection
(for instance, it can be a WSN requiring stealthy since it op-
erates on an adversary field or individual sensors positioned
on the ground but that do not form a network to save their
energy). In such applications, the drones of the fleets are
somehow mobile sinks to retrieve collected data. This kind
of uses of FoDs can exist in smart city scenarios where to
avoid crowding of radio frequency spectrum, sensors nodes
disseminated in the city may only emit with a very low
power that requires the recipient is very close to collect the
data; which such small drones can do.
For data collection tasks, drones of a fleet can be used
for inventories of RFID tagged assets if they are equipped
with RFID readers, but also of livestock in wide areas using
cameras.
Finally, a basic and common scenario of data collection
with drones that can be extended to FoDs is ground imaging
capture for different purposes, such as for military (to find
point of interests: position of enemies for instance) and agri-
culture (to view area requiring watering, or those requiring
treatment against a disease).
4. Swarm of Drones - Technology Perspective
In this section, we discuss a conceptual architecture that
can deployed for SoD.
4.1. Generic Architecture for SoD
The conceptual architecture shows the set of operations
in two different contexts: 1), how they are stacked in a
single drone, for example, operations are that specific (or
individual) to a drone and how it is related to other oper-
ations on the drone, and 2), how different operations are
actually a collaborative options in which the swarm decides
rather than individual drones. Figure 4 shows the conceptual
architecture. The architecture is divided into three layers
with some duplication and each layer; the rationale of these
is discussed in subsequent sections.
4.1.1. Drone Abstraction. This abstraction layer is focused
on a single drone operations, which preserves the drone as
an individual entity and includes:
D1 Flight Management: This operation ensures that the
drone remains in the air as required by the mission.
The flight management features can be semi-static or
partly dependent on F1 and can only be modified in
unique circumstance if required by S8.
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Figure 4. Conceptual architecture of SoD
D2 Navigation: This involves airborne movements within
the respective SoD, in relation to the external envi-
ronment, flight route, airspace authority’s injunction
and D5. Each drone has a static set of rules for its
navigation activity; however, these can be superseded
by the collaborative decision making process of the
SoD.
D3 Power and Performance Efficiency: This operation con-
tinually monitors in the drones power and performance
matrix – and at set intervals notifies the swarm. In
case the power and performance efficiency has severely
degraded, the conflicting self-preservation D8 and SoD
preferences (S3 and S8) kicks in and based on the
severity and mission requirements the drone can either
take the route of disengaging from the mission or
altruism.
D4 Service Level Maintenance: Similar to the D3, this
operation looks into the entirety of the services a drone
is offering as part of the SoD. Any delays or difficulty
to fulfil its obligations, required by the SoD, it will raise
the notification for the SoD (S5 and S6), so adequate
mitigation can be applied via F11, S7 and S8.
D5 Object Detection and Avoidance: This operation has
two aspects, first to detect a obstacle approaching the
flight path and second the avoid collision. These two
actions are dual nature, due to time criticality of this
operation, first option is that the decision might be
taken by a drone individually, but even in this case it
would notify the remaining swarm. The second option
is that obstacle is not detected by the drone itself but
by other swarm member and it takes adequate measure
to avoid it pre-emptively.
D6 Individual Mission Objectives: At the time of swarm
construction (section 4.2), the SoD owner would upload
the objectives of the mission. These objectives would
be specific to two levels, individual drones and the
fleet (F6). This information would detail the criticality
of mission, responsibility of individual drones and the
fleet as a whole. This information would be used by
D8, S3 and S5.
D7 Security, Safety and Privacy Measures: This operation
monitors the individual drone level security, safety and
privacy features. The baseline rule set can be pre-
defined either solely based on SoD owners design or
an autonomously evolved formulation (from a baseline)
based on the collaborate knowledge of all SoD flights
(carried out by the respective SoD or other SoDs in the
past). If a situation appears that an individual drone has
not encountered before, then it can raise that to the SoD
to take a collaborative decision (S8).
D8 Self-Preservation: Depending upon the criticality of the
mission, role of a drone and analysis from S5, a drone
might opt for selfish attitude to preserve its operational
integrity over the requirements of SoD or opt the altru-
ism approach. In the later approach, individual drone
might came to the decision to sacrifice its operational
integrity for the success of the mission or in corner
condition to upload the ethical principles (S4).
4.1.2. Fleet Abstraction. This abstraction layer bridges
between the decisions taken by individual drones on their
own and the course of action that is stipulated as part of the
mission brief from the SoD owner, with feed in from the
swarm abstraction layer in case an unexpected situation is
encountered in the wild.
F1 Flight Management: The operation that is configured
to manage the flight operations of the SoD as per pre-
defined mission brief. The flight management operation
is mission focused and pragmatic as depending on the
situation it would either opt for pre-defined plan or S8.
F2 Airspace Policy Management: This function of the SoD
remains in constant communication with airspace con-
troller and other drones operating in the same space to
comply with the regulations stipulated in the respective
region. When making decisions, whether by individual
drone or by the SoD as a whole, it consults this function
and abide by the airspace regulations.
F3 Navigation: This functions manages the airborne move-
ments of the fleet as a whole based on the F2 and
follows the feeds of F4.
F4 Flight Route Management: The route planner for the
whole of the fleet is triggered by either F2 and F7 –
but remains inside the airspace regulation (F2).
F5 Object Detection and Avoidance: Logically, at the fleet
abstraction layer this is part of the F4 but discussed
separately. It depends upon individual drones detection,
notification to the population in the SoD and potential
avoidance strategy formulation (fleet level) – based on
the analysis results of S8.
F6 Mission Objectives: Manages the fleet wide mission
objectives that are configured at the point of swarm
construction (discussed later). This function assists
multiple functions during the normal flight, however, in
unique situation the swarm abstraction layer takes over
to make adequate modification for successful comple-
tion or abortion of the mission.
F7 Congestion Detection and Avoidance: Based on the
drone sensors and/or external feed like airspace traf-
fic broadcasts, this function would identify potential
congestion on the selected route of the mission. Based
on this detection, it can notify the flight management
(F1) to take adequate actions.
F8 Secure Communication: Manages the set-up and main-
tenance of secure communication channels between
drones in the SoD and with external entities.
F9 Trust Establishment and Verification: Depending upon
the type of SoD (section 4.3) this functionality would
establishes the trust relationship between drones in the
SoD and with external entities.
F10 Policy Consolidation and Harmonisation: Depending
upon the type of the SoD (section 4.3) either all drones
would abide by a single policy (covering airspace
regulations, ethical principles and swarm participation
guidelines) or they have different, sometime conflicting
policies. When a drone enrols into a SoD this operation
verifies whether the enrolled drone is compatible with
the baseline policy of the SoD or not.
F11 Power and Performance Management: Computation
and power are two scarce resources for the SoD. This
operation continuously monitors individual drones state
and performs load-balancing to achieve maximum con-
tributions from individual member of the SoD.
4.1.3. Swarm Abstraction. This abstraction layer is the
foundation of the SoD proposal. The services in this layer,
similar to the other abstractions layers, are continuously
running on individual drones. This layer has a baseline
knowledge: a collection of knowledge that is accumulation
of all the SoD flights managed the SoD owner/operator.
Therefore, learning, evaluation and decision formulation
performed during a single mission then becomes part of the
collaborative knowledge to improve all future missions.
S1 Swarm Community Management: This service man-
ages the drones participating in the SoD, their con-
tributions and also detects any potential free-riders.
S2 Security and Privacy: Deals with the unique situations
encountered by the SoD that are specific to the security
and privacy-preservation.
S3 Safety and Self-Preservation: Similarly to the S2, this
service deals with safety and self-preservation of indi-
vidual drones and SoD as a whole.
S4 Ethical Principles: Set of ethical principles that are set
by the drones owner. The S8 will take these principles
into account when making decision.
S5 Mission Assessment: Swarm health feeds collected by
the S1 will be used by the mission assessment service
to perform the prediction of failure and success of the
whole mission. This prediction would be useful to make
challenging decision whether to continue the mission or
abort it. Furthermore, this analysis would be part of the
decision to take the mission abortion or an altruistic2
2. Altruistic Decision: Sacrificing few of the members of the SoD to
achieve overall mission objectives
decision.
S6 Collaborative Learning: The core module that contin-
uously learns from different feeds that is being shared
in the SoD. One point needs to be emphasised that the
learning process is also collaborative – as each of the
drones might not have the resources to perform this
entirely by itself.
S7 Collaborative Evaluation: Based on the learning, the
SoD would evaluate a situation collaborative to see
whether a precedent exists in the collaborative knowl-
edge, if not the collective make a decision au-
tonomously (S8).
S8 Collaborative Decision Formulation: The decision for-
mulation service that requires collaboration from the
SoD participants to reach a decision either based on
the existing knowledge or take a trail-error strategy. The
decision taken and its success would be recorded along
with the situation parameters – post-mission evaluation
and inclusion to the collaborative knowledge manage-
ment (further discussed in section 4.2).
S9 Collaborative Knowledge Management: One of the ob-
jective of the SoD is to accumulate the knowledge from
every mission to a single collaborate knowledge based
that can then be part of every subsequent missions –
exploring as many as possible permutations of scenar-
ios that SoD can encounter in the field.
4.2. Fleet Construction
Based on the conceptual model, the first step is the for-
mation of the SoD at the pre-mission stage and deformation
at the post-mission stage. Therefore the process of fleet
construction consists of two parts: pre-mission and post-
mission, which are discussed in this section.
At the pre-mission stage, the fleet construction process
begins with the formulation of a mission – with a set of
objectives. The mission control unit generates a mission
brief that includes mission objectives, airspace regulations,
ethical principles, security and privacy policies, organisation
commitments, baseline configuration (for first mission), and
collaborative knowledge. The mission brief is then commu-
nicated to the ground flight management system (GFMS).
This system would select the drones from the inventory that
would participate in the mission. This selection process is
based on the mission requirements, drone availability and
organisation preferences. Once the set of drones are selected,
the GFMS would then upload the mission brief to the se-
lected drones. Once the brief is uploaded, the drones would
establish secure communication channel among themselves
in the SoD. Once all drones are connected and GFMS has
given the permission to commence the mission, the SoD
would initiate.
After the completion of the mission, upon return of
the SoD participants to the base, the GFMS will connect
with each drone to download the mission logs, learning/e-
valuation matrix and potential material that can contribute
to the collaborative knowledge. The GFMS communicates
this information to the mission control centre that would
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Figure 5. Swarm of drones construction process – pre- and post-mission activities.
analyses the mission debriefing information and improves
the collaborative knowledge. Figure 5 shows the fleet con-
struction process with both pre- and post-mission activities.
4.3. Types of Swarm of Drones
In this section, we discuss three types of SoDs that can
be potentially deployed depending upon the target environ-
ment and situation.
4.3.1. Static SoD. The most basic type of the SoD is the
static SoD. In this formation, the members of the swarm are
pre-selected at the pre-mission stage. During the flight, no
new members can enrol into the swarm as the collective is
locked at the point of mission commencement. The secure
communication, mutual-trust and collaboration is setup by
the GFMS of the SoD owner. Any drone that is whether
belong to the respective SoD owner or not would be treated
as an external entity to the SoD during the flight. Figure 6
shows the static SoD in comparison with the dynamic SoD
discussed in the next section.
4.3.2. Dynamic SoD. In contrast to a static SoD, a dynamic
SoD is open to the inclusion of new members along with
existing members leaving the swarm at any point of time:
pre-mission and/or during the mission. Such a SoD can
either be a closed dynamic SoD that only allows enrolment
of new drones from the same organisation, or an open
dynamic SoD that allows enrolment of drones from any
third-party organisations. Whichever the case, the challenges
of secure communication, mutual trust and collaboration are
unique in comparison to static SoD.
4.3.3. Hybrid SoD. This variant of SoD combines both the
static and dynamic SoDs together into a single collaborative
unit. At the core of this SoD is a static SoD that behaves
like one in all of its operations. This static SoD, however,
is open to allowing other drones to join the swarm, thus
creating an extended swarm that behaves like a dynamic
SoD. One thing to note is that the core swarm takes high
priority when making any collaborative learning, evaluation
and decisions. The extended swarm can be viewed as drones
that join the static SoD and would provide a service to the
core swarm in return for some fair exchange. Members of
the extended swarm can leave the collective at any stage.
Figure 7 shows the hybrid SoD construction.
4.4. SoD Collaboration Models
In this section we discuss three variants of collaboration
models for the SoD.
1) Centralised: In this collaboration model, there is a
powerful, master drone in the SoD that collets all the
feeds from individual drones and assists the swarm in
computing and agreeing on decisions.
2) Decentralised: In this collaboration model, there is no
single master drone, but instead a small subset of
powerful drones that collect the feeds from their neigh-
bouring drones and then these powerful drones perform
the collaborative learning, evaluation and decision.
3) Distributed (Peer-Oriented): In this model, each and
every participant of the SoD have more or less equal
role in all collaborative learning, evaluation and deci-
sion making process. It can be noted that the activity
load is distributed among the population based on their
individual capabilities, current performance and power
resources and the criticality of their unique features to
overall mission.
5. Open Challenges of Swarm of Drones
In this section, we selected a very short list of open
problems of the SoD. They are categorised into two cate-
gories: 1), Security, Privacy and Trust related, and 2), Per-
formance and Energy Consumption related. The implication
and importance of these open issues are listed in Table 1,
represented by number of ∎; the higher the number, the
more crucial this open issue is to the success of the SoD.
Static drones swarm
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5.1. Security, Privacy and Trust Related
SP1 Swarm Authentication, Attestation and Secure Commu-
nication: SoDs have to negotiate with external entities
that include the airspace controllers, and other UAVs
(includes SoDs). Beside this, for dynamic and hybrid
types of SoDs, the inclusion of new drones and de-
listing of ones that leave the swarm is another chal-
lenge. This open issue does not impact the static SoD
as much it does the other two types.
SP2 Fair Exchange Services Architecture for Swarm of
Drones: When drones participate in a group supporting
swarm intelligence-based mechanisms to create a SoD,
individual drones should have this synergy worthwhile.
This should not tax them to the extend that solo mission
is comparatively less costly and have negative impact
on performance and energy of the drone than if it does
not participates in the SoD. Fair exchange becomes way
more relevant in the case of dynamic and hybrid SoD as
during the flight swarms would potentially be changing
and to identify the benefits of joining a swarm has to be
clear and verifiable – use fair-exchange mechanisms.
SP3 Collaborated Cybersecurity Deterrence Mechanism:
This open issue concerns with how swarm intelligence
can be deployed to provide a wide range of counter-
measures – protecting individual drone and the whole
of SoD. This is still an open issue and potentially the
most crucial element of the SoD proposal.
SP4 Detecting the Mole and Free-Riders in the Swarm: This
open issues relates to the SP2, however, it focuses on
detecting free-riders in the SoD. A free-rider is a drone
in the SoD that does not contribute its fair share and
becomes a burden on the rest of the drones in the SoD.
5.2. Performance and Energy Consumption
PE1 Balancing the Cybersecurity with Performance and En-
ergy Consumption: we have seen in section 1.2.3 that
the computational power and the energy consumption
of a drone is highly impacted by several factors. Among
these, it is clear that MCOs (including critical event
response capabilities), algorithms, data management
(ciphering for instance) are of utmost importance. All
these aspects must thus be mitigated with the cyberse-
curity issues in a holistic approach.
PE2 Graceful Degradation – Altruism versus Selfish-
Survival: Graceful Degradation is of course part of the
intrinsic management system of each drone. Still, when
combined as a swarm, this should not longer be con-
sidered only at the level of one single drone but at the
level of the swarm as a whole. Indeed, depending on the
mission, it must be decided if it is more important for
each drone to save its own energy/computational power
(selfish approach) or if cooperating (and thus sharing
Table 1. IMPORTANCE OF OPEN CHALLENGE/PROBLEM TO
COMBINATION OF SOD TYPES AND COLLABORATION MODELS.
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 PE1 PE2
Static SoD
Centralised ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻
Decentralised ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Distributed ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Dynamic SoD
Centralised ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻
Decentralised ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Distributed ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Hybrid SoD
Centralised ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻
Decentralised ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Distributed ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ◻ ◻ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
energy consumption/computational load) is more ap-
propriate to ensure the success of the mission (altruist
approach).
6. Conclusion
The potential for having an independent and autonomous
set of drones, whether we call them FoD or SoD, is gradually
becoming necessary, especially with the increased complex-
ities of making real-time decisions by individual or fleets
of drones in an overcrowded and regulated airspace. For
such an eventuality, the application of swarm intelligence in
the UAVs domain is only a natural progression of the field.
In this paper, we forwarded the rationale for drone fleets,
the need for them to be independent and autonomous in
the wild, and the application of swarm intelligence. We also
explained a conceptual architecture to integrate swarm intel-
ligence as a core function, not a merely restricted to a single
function like traffic management, it manages and controls a
wide range of functions and decisions at the individual drone
and fleet level. To support this conceptual architecture, we
have also listed different types and collaboration models of
SoD along with open issues whose solutions are crucial to
the success of the application of swarm intelligence as a
core function of the FoDs.
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